The sudden death of President Ebrahim Raisi and his companions in a helicopter crash on May 19, have revealed or accentuated some trends in Iranian politics.
Discussions about the Supreme Leader’s looming succession issue, primarily driven by speculation, have been sidelined for now as new issues come to the forefront – with three key trends emerging.
Sanctification
The Iranian state propaganda machine consistently pushes narratives that are 180 degrees opposite of what many Iranians say in public and how they act. For example, as many increasingly distance themselves from religious sanctity in public life, the government places even greater emphasis on it. Following Raisi’s death, videos were circulated of people kissing his coffin, and high-ranking clerics sharing stories about the first Shia imam “speaking” to him.
In another sanctification of Raisi, the governor of Neyshabur shared a “vision” reported by someone at the funeral – and allegedly connected to the Hidden Imam, the 12th Imam in Shia Islam, believed to be alive but hidden and expected to reappear at the end of times. This supposed vision, seen on the night of the helicopter crash, depicted the Hidden Imam at the crash site. He was said to be anxiously moving near the crash site but ultimately decided not to perform a miracle.
The frequent presence of clerics in Shia mausoleums and cemeteries has revived old beliefs about their connection to Shia saints. The Islamic Republic’s propaganda apparatus promotes these superstitions, presenting them to the relatives of the deceased as if they were true.
Routinization
Ali Khamenei has demonstrated that he does not want any change in the ruling class. The vote of about two-thirds of the parliament members for Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf as speaker reflects the Leader’s desire for continuity and stability. Despite the faction currently controlling both the parliament and the executive branch not presenting any plan to address the country’s problems, it will remain in power. Khamenei is disregarding the many corruption allegations against Ghalibaf.
Following Khamenei’s advice, the government is attempting to portray a sense of normalcy. To this end, they have invited Mohammad Bin Salman to visit Iran. It is interesting that the Islamic Republic is using the invitation to bolster claims of normalcy while they have routinely called Saudi Arabia the “worst state in the world”.
Domestically, they are creating an illusion of participation and competition by including figures like former Parliament Speaker Ali Larijani, potentially Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and dozens of others in the presidential elections, despite these individuals having been previously purged from the political scene. This move is presented as if it can revitalize the political landscape.
A new wave of arrests and intimidation
Due to widespread public opposition to the government, arrests of dissidents have been ongoing. However, the specific targets and directions of these arrests shift according to circumstances and events.
In the post-Raisi era, the widespread arrests and clampdown have focused on individuals celebrating, mocking, or ridiculing the regime in connection with the helicopter crash.
Before the arrests began, the country’s Attorney General warned and threatened the public. “It is necessary to take necessary measures against those who misuse cyberspace about this incident to disturb the mental security of the society and disturb the public mind by publishing false content, lies, and insults; according to the regulations, a quick, effective, and deterrent action will be taken, and the result will be announced to this prosecutor’s office,” he said.
In its announcement regarding the unexpected incident involving the president and the accompanying delegation, the Cyber Police stated that, in fulfilling its inherent duties and assigned missions, it carefully monitors cyberspace. Users are advised not to pay attention to rumors and false news.
The semi-official news agency ISNA, quoting Kerman province’s public prosecutor, reported that 288 social network users were identified as “virtual activists and leaders.” In addition to “phone warning and guidance” to 254 people, “eight were summoned” to the judicial authorities.
